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Abstract: The new Hungarian Labour Code came into effect on the 1st of July 2012. The main objective of the
reform is flexibilisation of labour law in order to increase the employment rate by promoting competitiveness
of employers. This new orientation of labour law policy has been widely criticised, since the immediate effect
of the new Act is the reduction of employee protection. Firstly, the paper describes the main objectives and
background of the labour law reform. Secondly, we elucidate the main points of the reform, with a special
emphasis on the situation of trade unions. The main question is, what effects may be expected as a conse-
quence of flexibilised employment protection and diminished trade union rights.
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1. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF THE REFORM: 
THE MOST FLEXIBLE LABOUR MARKET IN THE WORLD?
1.1 Background of the 2012 reform
After the Second World War, Hungarian labour law, as all the other socialist labour laws
in the region, was characterised by the existence of a Labour Code. During the socialist
period (1948–1990) two Labour Codes were passed (1951 and 1967)2 and this legal struc-
ture was maintained by passing the 1992 Labour Code.3 The 1992 Labour Code laid down
minimum standards and more favourable rules might have been regulated by collective
agreements. The 1992 Labour Code was criticized by legal practitioners, academics and
politicians in relation to the following three problems:
a) The social and economic background of the Labour Code has been dramatically
changed since 1990. The large state companies had disappeared and the dominant role
of the former socialist industry has been taken by the third sector with micro and small
businesses. The provisions of the 1992 Labour Code, tailored for large companies, cannot
be applied properly in the new economic situation.
b) The original text of the 1992 Labour Code was amended too many (about 50)
times, thus, the original meaning of many rules has been lost, what resulted in unpre-
dictable court decisions. Consequently simplification and clarification of the existing
‘patchwork’ regulation became a general desire, developing the new rules on the basis
of court case law. 
c) The crucial problem of the Hungarian labour market is the extremely low employ-
ment rate, and the main reason is the very high cost of employment. In the opinion of em-
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ployers’ organizations and several labour law practitioners, this cost shall primarily be cut
by flexibilisation of employment law. Accordingly, they argued, that diminishing the rights
of employees and trade unions would considerably increase the employment level. Evi-
dently, this assessment was refused by trade unions and several academics. 
1.2 Objectives and reality
Since the government fully agreed with the statement on flexibilization of labour law
(point c. above), thus it became the central pillar and also the main ‘battlefield’ of the 2012
labour law reform. Flexibilisation was based on the legal policy argument of approximat-
ing labour law to civil (private) law. The simplification of legislation (point b. above) was
handled as a secondary issue and the critic on the changing social, economic background
(point a. above) was simply “lost in translation”.4 Thus, the main question concerning the
2012 labour law reform is, whether rigidity of the Labour Code has been earlier the main
obstacle of increasing employers’ competitiveness and the number of employees in the
Hungarian labour market. 
The employment rate was 55,4 % in 2010, constantly the second lowest in the EU after
Malta (EU average 64,6 %) and it was very far from the targets of the Europe 2020 Strategy.5
After 2010 the employment rate increased, however, almost exclusively in the form of pub-
lic work programs.6 If we look at only the number of employees in the open labour market,
excluding the number of civil servants, Hungarians working abroad and public workers,
then there has not been considerable increase since July 2012.7 Evidently, it is hard to iso-
late the impact of the new Labour Code on employment growth, as it is a complex issue
influenced by several policies beyond labour law, such as economic trends, taxation, active
labour market measures etc.
Consequently, the main objective of the reform is flexibilisation of employment protec-
tion, in order to increase the employment rate by promoting competitiveness of employers.
This strategy is in contrast with studies, which show that the Hungarian Labour Code has
been quite flexible in an international comparison in the last two decades.8 In spite of this
analysis, the government declared, that the Hungarian labour market shall be “the most flex-
ible in the world”9, which will help to create one million new jobs in ten years (2010–2020).10
The flexibilisation strategy of the government identified the following areas, where the
provisions of the 1992 Labour Code shall be fundamentally changed: regulatory role of col-
lective agreements, termination of employment, working time, liability of employers for
damages and trade union rights. It is the crucial question concerning the success of this
governmental policy, whether these new flexible rules will generate one million new jobs. 
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In our opinion the new Labour Code may be a successful element in regional com-
petition for foreign investments, since large, predominantly multinational companies
may profit the most from these flexible employment provisions. But the small and
micro enterprises hardly apply the Labour Code in practice, as the enforcement of the
Labour Code is in general problematic in this part of the economy.11 Thus weaker em-
ployment protection may contribute to economic growth but hardly generates mass
employment.
The main critic of the new Labour Code is that the new rules degraded the protection
of employees. Approximately half of the former labour law rules were fully or fundamen-
tally amended, and the majority (circa 4 out of 5) of the modified provisions are disadvan-
tageous for employees. Obviously, it would be impossible to give a comprehensive analysis
of the new Labour Code in this article, thus the next chapter will briefly present some con-
ceptual changes.
2. MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE REFORM: VARIED SOURCES OF FLEXIBILITY
The most important conceptual changes as well as withdrawals from former employee
rights are as follows:
- enhanced role of collective agreements; 
- decentralization of collective bargaining;
- collective agreement concluded by a Works Council;
- flexible regulation of working time and wage supplements;
- downgraded protection against unfair dismissal; 
- limited liability of employers for damages;
- flexible regulation and new forms of atypical employment;
- reduced trade union rights.
2.1 Enhanced role of collective agreements: in melius and in peius deviation
from the Labour Code
The most fundamental change is the increased role of collective agreements in the
regulation of employment relationships. The 1992 Labour Code laid down minimum
standards, and altering rules could be regulated by a collective agreement, if it was
more favorable to employees (in melius deviation).12 Exceptionally, amendments of the
1992 Labour Code introduced a few dispositive rules on working time after 2001, from
which the parties could derogate to the detriment of the employees as well (in peius
deviation). 
Thus employers were simply not interested in concluding collective agreements, as it
would have increased their costs without real offset. Certainly, there are further reasons
behind the traditionally low number of collective agreements, such as the lack of collective
bargaining tradition, weakness of trade unions, dominance of small and medium sized
workplaces etc. 
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According to data from 2009, only 33,9 % (901 500 persons) of all employees (2 656 000
people) were covered by any kind of collective agreement (workplace, sector etc.). In other
words, approximately 2/3 of the Hungarian employees are not covered by any collective
agreement. This rate is very low compared to the EU bargaining coverage rate of 66 %,
thus, in contrast to the Hungarian figures two-thirds of all EU employees are covered by
a collective agreement.13 Although the scope of collective agreements may be extended to
an entire sector of the economy as well, in spite of it only 8,6 % of Hungarian employees
were covered in 200914 by such sector level agreements.15
Moreover, the substance of collective agreements has traditionally been rather inade-
quate and poor. Most of the collective agreements just repeat the rules of the Labour Code
or include meaningless conditions.16 Therefore, the practice shows double unfavorable
pictures. On the one hand, the number of collective agreements is very low, on the other
hand, the content of existing agreements is also far from desirable. 
The above described situation has not been changed by the detailed regulation of sector
level collective bargaining in the separate Act on Sectoral Social Dialogue Committees in
2009.17 This Act introduced the possibility, that sector level collective agreements may be
concluded in a Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee. However, experience showed the fail-
ure of this attempt, since these Sectoral Social Dialogue Committees has managed to con-
clude only a few such agreements.18 This deficiency may be partly explained by the fact,
that employers’ organizations represented in the above mentioned committees employ
only a small proportion of employees, therefore it would be senseless to conclude a sector
level collective agreement in order to establish uniform working conditions in the entire
sector. Besides, many employers’ organizations were influenced by the economic crisis to
emphasize the difficulties in long-term planning, what would be an inevitable condition
of concluding such an agreement. Thus, the Sectoral Social Dialogue Committees gave an
adequate institutional framework for sectoral level social dialogue, in spite of that it could
not change the motivation of the parties and the low interest in concluding higher level
collective agreements.19
The new Labour Code introduced radical changes in the relationship between the
statute and collective agreements: collective agreements may derogate from most of the
rules on the employment relationship and on collective rights to the detriment of employ-
ees as well.20 The new soft representativity criteria of trade unions may also foster collective
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bargaining: a trade union shall be entitled to conclude a collective agreement if its mem-
bership reaches 10% of all workers employed by the employer.21
These changes may promote collective bargaining at workplace level and collective au-
tonomy will play a more significant role in employment regulation. However it is rather
questionable, that the players on the two sides of industry (employers as well as trade
unions) are well prepared for the collective bargaining process. At the same time, collective
bargaining will remain at workplace level, since the conclusion of sector level collective
agreements is not facilitated by the new legal and economic framework either, and the
detailed rules are still missing from the Labour Code. Although there is not any data on
these developments, but the social partners have not really reported remarkable develop-
ments regarding the number and contents of collective agreements.22
2.2 Decentralization of collective bargaining: a harmful step
As an exception to the lack of special provisions on sector level collective agreements,
the Labour Code regulates the relationship between higher (sector, subsector etc.) and
lower (workplace) level collective agreements. According to the 1992 Labour Code, a col-
lective agreement concluded at the workplace level may depart from one with a broader
scope (sector, subsector) insofar as it specifies more favorable regulations for employees.23
Although the new Labour Code retained this principle, however, added an important
exception, giving floor to decentralization of collective bargaining. Namely, a collective
agreement of limited effect (concluded at the employer) may derogate from one with
a broader scope (concluded at sector or subsector level) insofar as it contains more favor-
able regulations for the employees, unless otherwise provided in the higher level collective
agreement.24 Therefore, the higher (sector, subsector) level collective agreement may con-
tain a provision allowing the employer level collective agreement to derogate from its pro-
vision to the detriment of employees. This new possibility will weaken the capability of
higher level collective agreements to standardize working conditions in an entire sector,
thus it is a harmful legislative move, even if this opportunity will not be exploited widely.
2.3 Collective agreement concluded by a Works Council: 
the absolute dogmatic failure
The real bad news is that the new Labour Code allows works council agreements, con-
cluded by the Works Council and the employer, to take over the role of the collective agree-
ment. Before the 2012 reform Works Council agreements had a very different nature, since
only “issues pertaining to the privileges of a Works Council and its relations with the em-
ployer” shall be set forth in such an agreement.25
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According to the new Labour Code, the primary role of works council agreements is
still arrangement of the relationship between the Works Council and the employer. How-
ever, works council agreements may contain provisions to govern rights and obligations
arising in connection with employment relationships (normative part of the collective
agreement). There is only one exception, namely works council agreements must not
derogate from the provisions on wages.26 Such works council (pseudo collective) agree-
ments may be concluded on condition that the employer is not covered by the collective
agreement it has concluded, and there is no trade union at the employer with entitlement
to conclude a collective agreement.27
The number of collective agreements is still very low, so the clear aim of this measure
is to promote the conclusion of “almost” collective agreements in medium sized compa-
nies. A Works Council shall be elected if the average number of employees at the employer
or at the employer’s independent establishment or division is higher than fifty.28 Usually
there is no trade union at employer level, as employee organizations are concentrated in
large companies, particularly in state-owned (eg. Hungarian Railways and other public
service companies) and multinational firms (eg. Tesco, Audi). Consequently, all the other
firms have not really had a tradition, practice or even interest in collective bargaining. This
situation may change a bit, as these medium sized employers will be motivated to con-
clude a works council agreement in order to profit from the flexibility of working time,
wages etc. provision by way of derogation. 
Although, the above described legislative objective, the promotion of collective bar-
gaining in a wider range of medium sized companies, may be acknowledged, at the same
time this legal solution raises serious dogmatic problems and doubts. Above all, the legal
nature of a Works Council, as a labour law institution, must be the starting point: Works
Councils are designed to foster “cooperation between employers and workers, and taking
part in the employers’ decisions”.29 This idea of participation seriously contradicts with
the attributes of collective bargaining. 
Furthermore, the Works Council must remain unbiased in relation to a strike organized
against the employer, and they may not organize, support or obstruct strikes.30 The lack
of effective collective actions weakens the bargaining position of Works Councils.31 The
labour law protection of the members of Works Councils is also missing, since only the
chair of the Works Council enjoys protection against termination of employment.32
Moreover, there is a danger, that certain employers may urge the election of “friendly”
works councils in order to create a partner for concluding a works council agreement dero-
gating from the Labour Code in the employer’s interest. First and last, the works council
agreement, substituting a collective agreement, is a dogmatic failure and entails serious
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risks, however, it is hard to assess the prospective harm of this legal solution. Unfortunately
there is no data on the number of such agreements, but in our opinion their real number
is negligible. Thus this possibility should be deleted from the Labour Code.
2.4 Extremely flexible regulation of working time and wage supplements
The new chapters on working time and wages provide many obvious examples, how
at first sight minor amendments may substantially affect working conditions. For in-
stance the former compulsory wage supplement for afternoon shift work was deleted
from the Labour Code, which may further reduce the generally low salary in large com-
panies using shift workers (the national gross average is about 750 euros). Moreover, the
basic wage may include most of the wage supplements provided by the Labour Code by
agreement of the parties.33 The collective agreement or the parties’ agreement may of
course contain such a payment, however, the inclusion of an ‘extra payment clause’ is
rather doubtful at many workplaces due to the weak bargaining power of workers, lack
of trade unions and the hard labour market situation (high unemployment). Certainly,
there are many similar changes in these chapters, which erase former “acquired em-
ployee rights”, which amendments have been intensely opposed by trade unions during
the debate.
2.5 Unfair dismissal: radically limited sanctions
Termination of employment has not been really changed, but rather simplified, there-
fore termination by the employer has not become easier even a bit. Nevertheless, the legal
consequences of unlawful termination (unfair dismissal) by the employer has been sig-
nificantly restricted, thus, in certain cases an unfair dismissal may be even cheaper for
the employer than continuation of an (unwanted) employment relationship.34
According to the new rules, compensation for loss of income from employment may
not exceed twelve months’ absentee pay (wage).35 Formerly, the employee was entitled to
full payment between the dates of the termination of employment and the decision of the
court, beyond an extra payment of 2–12 months’ salary or reinstatement of the job. It is
beyond question, that the old system was not always fair with employers, as in case the
court proceeding lasted for 3, 4 or even 5 years, the employee was often entitled to a huge
amount of compensation. Moreover, the employee was not obliged to mitigate the dam-
ages of the employer by searching for a new job in this period. Even if this system was jus-
tified by deterring employers to breach the rules on termination of employment, it pun-
ished employers for the length of court proceedings as well. 
As a legislative answer for the above described problems, the new rules put the empha-
sis less on punishing the employer, but rather on recovering only a part of the damages of
the employee in case of a wrongful dismissal. However, by limiting the compensation for
loss of income to a maximum of twelve months’ absentee pay with a very limited option
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to restore the employment relationship,36 it is questionable whether the employee receives
appropriate reparation and whether the employer is efficiently restrained from similar
unlawful measures. The new system has already caused a remarkable decrease in the num-
ber of labour law disputes.37
2.6 Limited liability of employers for damages
More radical changes were introduced regarding the employer’s liability for damages.
Although the former general rule of objective liability was maintained, whereby the em-
ployer shall be liable to provide compensation for damages caused in connection with
an employment relationship, however, the new exemption clauses remarkably restricted
this liability. Namely, the employer shall be relieved of liability if able to prove: a) that the
damage occurred in consequence of unforeseen circumstances beyond his control, and
there had been no reasonable cause to take action for preventing or mitigating the dam-
age; or b) that the damage was caused solely by the unavoidable conduct of the aggrieved
party.38
The reason behind this conceptual change is the will to restrict the almost absolute li-
ability of employers, which was clearly established by court case law based on the provi-
sions of the 1992 Labour Code.39 However, the ILO recommended maintaining the wording
of the 1992 Labour Code, since ILO standards do not recognize such elements of force ma-
jeure as an acceptable ground for refusing employment injury compensation. „With the
exception of some limitative enumerated cases, ILO instruments aim at ensuring that em-
ployment injuries should be compensated with no fault imputed to either side, and com-
pensation shall be provided without any question being raised as to whether the injury
was attributable to fault on the part of the employer, the employee or any third party.”40
2.7 Atypical employment relationships: flexible regulation and new forms
The 1992 Labor Code regulated five atypical employment relationships: part time em-
ployment, open-ended employment relationship, telework, temporary agency work and
the employment relationship of executive employees. Besides, some other laws deter-
mined other forms of atypical employment (e.g. work from home, casual work). The new
Labor Code expanded the list of atypical employment relationships. The appraised em-
ployment relationships according to the Law are presented in the chart below, sorted by
the attributes of the typical employment relationship.
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                       Attributes of typical                                           Atypical employment which 
                employment relationship                                             differs by such attribute
  Open-ended employment relationship       Fixed term employment relationship
                                                                                       Simplified employment
                                                                                      Part time employment
  Full time employment                                        On-call work
                                                                                       Job sharing
  Work at employer’s premises                           Telework
                                                                                       Home work
                                                                                      Temporary agency work
  Work for one employer                                       School association employment relationship
                                                                                       Employment relationship with more employers
Obviously, the legislature strives for full regulation of employment relationships, which
may give some stability to the otherwise regularly (too often) changing provisions.41 The
other reason behind this abundance of atypical forms in the new Labour Code is the as-
sumption, that these forms may be the main generator of the one million new jobs. Ac-
cording to the National Work Plan, the low Hungarian employment rate is closely con-
nected to the low activity rates among some disadvantaged groups of employees on the
labour market such as women with small children, young workers, elder workers some
years before the pensionable age, workers whose employability has changed due to an ac-
cident etc. By referring to international experience, the document points out that the em-
ployability of these disadvantaged groups could be enhanced by the extension of flexible
forms of employment.42
However, some rules on atypical forms of employment, especially regarding on-call
work, job sharing and joint employment, are fairly brief and sketchy. Hungarian legal prac-
tice have shown so far reluctance from using vaguely regulated new legal institutions, con-
sequently, it is doubtful whether the adoption of these new forms of employment in itself
will generate the expected employment effect.
2.8 Right to strike: minimum services
The Basic Law (constitution) guarantees the right to strike,43 however, the detailed pro-
vision are contained by a separate law and not in the Labour Code.44 Therefore, the new
Labour Code did not have any effect on strike regulation. At the same time there has been
one significant amendment to the law on strike, namely the regulation of the minimum
services. Accordingly minimum services must be ensured at employers, which provide
public services, such as public transport, communications, electricity, water supply etc.45
This minimum level may be regulated by law, otherwise the parties must agree on it, or
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45 In force from 31 December 2010.
the court may decide on the details of the minimum level. In practice it means that the
most active trade unions (eg. at Budapest Transport Company) may go on strike only after
the decision of the court on minimum services. 
3. TRADE UNIONS: THE ULTIMATE LOSERS OF THE REFORM?
3.1 Changing relationship of trade unions and Works Councils
According to the 1992 Labour Code, the representativity of trade unions was based on
the results their candidates achieved at the elections of Works Councils.46 As the most im-
portant union rights were ensured only to representative trade unions (e.g. stipulation of
a collective agreement), it was the best interest of the union to raise as many candidates
to the elections as possible and to facilitate their effectiveness by all means. The union’s
candidates generally were members or officials of the trade union. 
As a result, if such union-candidates were elected as Works Council members, the per-
sonnel of the two different organizations were united, and the employer was to consult the
same persons in the Works Council and at the bargaining table over a new collective agree-
ment. Due to the different attributes of the two organizations of employee’s representation,
such practice proved to be unbeneficial. In many cases the “legally lightly armored” Works
Councils lost their autonomy, and became a consultative body of the trade unions. 
According to the new Labor Code, exercising union rights is not based on the results
achieved at the works council’s elections any more. Now a trade union may conclude a col-
lective agreement if its membership reaches ten per cent of all workers.47 So it has a lower
chance that trade unions and works councils fuse together. However, as Works Councils
have many important rights, it could still be useful for trade unions to get as many man-
dates in Works Councils as possible.
3.2 Trade unions versus Works Councils: reshuffled rights
Albeit the new Labour Code considers none of the two types of employee’s representa-
tion primary over the other, one could experience a shift of emphasis in favor of works
councils’:
- In the structure of the Code the rules concerning Works Councils are presented
before the rules of trade unions, which was the other way round in the previous
Labour Code.
- According to the new law, monitoring the compliance with labour law became
the general task of Works Councils and not of trade unions as it was before, even
though the necessary authority is not assured for works councils (e.g. the right to
initiate proceedings before authorities).48
- EU law calls for consultation with the representatives of the employees in cases
of restructuring the employer’s organization (transfer, collective redundancy). The
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new Labour Code grants this authority specifically for Works Council and not
trade unions.49
- Finally, the new Labour Code allows the employer to conclude a works council
agreement which is equivalent to the collective agreement, provided that there is
no collective agreement at the employer or a trade union entitled to conclude
one.
Considering the aspect of protection of employees’ interests, the significance of trade
unions is obviously higher than of Works Councils, as the later can influence the decisions
of the employer only by its rights for consulting and informing. Thus it seems odd that the
new Labour Code gives Works Councils a role to substitute unions. Whatever authority is
granted for Works Councils by law, it cannot supplement the organizing power of trade
unions.
3.3 Shrinking rights of trade unions
The new Labour Code diminishes the rights of trade unions in several respects:
a) The legal protection against termination of employment is provided not for every
officer of the trade union (as in the 1992 LC), but only for minimum 2, maximum
6 officers (depending on the number of employees at the workplace).50
b) The employees designated by the trade union are entitled to a shorter working
time reduction, this is one hour after every second member of the trade union51.
In this way, if the trade union has 200 members by the employer, its members are
entitled to 100 extra hours/month. 
c) Working time reduction cannot be redeemed by the employer, if the trade unions
are not using this extra working time.52 On the contrary, the 1992 Labour Code al-
lowed redeeming half of the extra working time, if the trade union members were
not using it.53 This was an important source of income of trade unions. 
Despite these restrictions, the position of trade unions will be strengthened by the
changing role of collective agreements in the regulation of employment relations. Accord-
ing to the new rules, trade unions can derogate from most of the rules of the Labour Code
to the detriment of employees (see above). In this way trade unions will gain a strong bar-
gaining position against employers and their responsibility is also higher concerning the
result of such bargaining.54
3.4 Labour law protection: restricted number of protected trade union officials 
Consequently, the most important change concerning the legal status of trade unions
refers to union officials. As the trade union official is a central actor in the collective life at
the employer, he/she is granted a special legal protection against otherwise unilateral
EFFECTS OF THE NEW HUNGARIAN LABOUR CODE: THE MOST FLEXIBLE...            233–245
243TLQ 4/2015  | www.ilaw.cas.cz/tlq
49 Article 72 and 265 of the 2012 Labour Code.
50 Article 273 of the 2012 Labour Code.
51 In the 1992 Labour Code this was 2 hours after every third member of the trade union.
52 Article 273 of the 2012 Labour Code.
53 Article 25 of the 1992 Labour Code.
54 http://www.hrblog.hu/azujmt/2012/01/27/uzemi-tanacs-kontra-szakszervezet-ki-az-erosebb-1-resz-2/.
measures of the employer, which could uproot her among the workers whose interests
she represents. Such protection shortly means that the employer is entitled to make uni-
lateral decisions concerning the trade union official only if previously consulted with and
got consent of the trade union. According to the new Labor Code such measures are only
dismissal and employment differing from the employment contract.55 Especially the pro-
tection against dismissal has significance in practice, as the employer shall terminate the
employment relationship of a trade union official only with the previous written consent
of the trade union.
Whilst according to the 1992 Labor Code this labour law protection was granted for
each and any office holders of the trade union, the new rules restrict the number of pro-
tected officials. At all autonomous establishment of the employer, based on the average
statistical number of employees in the previous calendar year, the maximum number of
protected trade union officials is determined by law. Not depending on the number of the
employees, all unions which has representation at the employer are entitled to protect
plus one official, who is selected by the supreme body of the union. 
             Number of employees                                        
Number of protected officials
               at the establishment
                                                                       At the given establishment                               
  1–500 persons                                         1 person                                           + 1 person for the whole
  501–1000                                                   2 persons                                         employer, chosen by the
  1001–2000                                                 3 persons                                      supreme body of the union
  2001–4000                                                 4 persons                                                                 
  4001–                                                          5 persons                                                                 
It frequently occurs that an employee is a trade union official and member of the Works
Council too. In such situations, according to the previous court practice, the legal protec-
tion applied to the person by both titles, and both the union and the Works Council needed
to give consent.56 Such ’overprotection’ is not sustained by the new regulation: if the chair
of the Works Council happens to be a protected trade union official as well, the labour law
protection applies to him only by the latter title.57
While the new rules on trade union officials aim to decrease the number of protected
employees, the transitory rules of the new Labour Code prescribed that all officials who
were granted labour law protection the day before the new Code came to effect (that is
30th of June 2012), will stay under that protection until their employment relationship ends
or they loose their union mandate.58 Interestingly, the legislator made a step back at the
last moment, and left the previously mandated union officials’ protection unharmed.
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55 Article 273 of the 2012 Labour Code.
56 See e.g. court decision BH 2000, 463.
57 Article 260 (5) of the 2012 Labour Code.
58 Act 86 of 2012, Article 14 (1).
4. APPRAISAL OF THE REFORM: AN UNAMBIGUOUS MOVE TOWARDS
FLEXIBILITY 
Although the main aim of the new Hungarian Labour Code is clear, that is to rapidly
increase the employment rate, however it is rather doubtful whether a more flexible reg-
ulation of labour law is the proper way to reach this ambitious goal. The most contested
issue is whether and to what extent the reform will contribute to reach the desired em-
ployment objective of the government, i.e. to create 1 million new jobs within 10 years. 
The new Labour Code amended about half of the text of the 1992 Labour Code and in-
troduced fundamental changes. It is still far from being the most flexible labour law in Eu-
rope, however, the changes mainly favour employers’ interests to the detriment of em-
ployees.59 It is of course questionable whether labour law does play such an important
role in investment decisions that this reform will be an effective instrument to create more
(and especially better) jobs.60
At the same time, the truly much more “flexible” labour law regulation will contribute
to the deepening of social inequalities. As a recent OECD report points out “a key challenge
for policy, therefore, is to facilitate and encourage access to employment for under-repre-
sented groups, such as youths, older workers, women and migrants. This requires not only
new jobs, but jobs that enable people to avoid and escape poverty. Policy reforms that
tackle inequalities in the labour market, such as those between standard and non-stan-
dard forms of employment, are needed to reduce income inequality.”61
At the same time the new regulation sets an enormous challenge for Hungarian trade
unions. Whether they can grow up to their new role in the changed legal circumstances
and be an equal bargaining partner with employers is yet to be seen.
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59 GYULAVÁRI, T., HŐS, N., KÁRTYÁS, G., TAKÁCS, G. A Munka Törvénykönyve 2012. Kompkonzult. Budapest, 2012.
60 More and better jobs: Patterns of employment expansion in Europe. European Foundation for the Improvement
of Living and Working Conditions, 2008.
61 Divided we stand: Why inequality keeps rising. An Overview of Growing Income Inequalities in OECD Countries:
Main Findings. OECD, 2012, p. 41.
